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In our imagination 20th century emigration of scientists lives according 
to how Leo Szilard remembers his own case: "Hitler came into office in 
January '33 and I had no doubt what would happen. I lived in the faculty club 
of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Berlin Dahlem" Szilard wrote "and I had 
my suitcases packed. By this I mean that I had literally two suitcases standing 
in my room which were packed." In the beginning of April he suddenly felt 
that the moment had arrived, took a train with his suitcases and left Germany 
for good. The continuation is but a pinch of salt to the story: fleeing in masses 
began the next day and the Germans started to control the trains. Szilard's 
conclusion is simple: "if you want to succeed in this world, you don't have to 
be much cleverer than other people, you just have to be one day earlier than 
most people." [1] 
Szilard, of course, always did his best to be "at least one day earlier". The 
famous Hungarian immigrant scientists like e.g. Bekesy, Teller, von Neu-
mann, Wigner suffered the state as other refugees had to suffer, but they 
always indulged also in their favourite hobby, in something "different". 
According to its title, this paper is about the second step of emigration 
of Hungarians, that was preceded also in their case by a first step I had 
previously spoken about and which I therefore wish to summarize in short 
here and now. [2] This first step took them from their native country to 
Germany which had. been the centre of European science in up till the first 
decade of the century. But they left for Germany not only as a result of the 
pull exercised by the centre, as could be supposed on the basis of the centre-
periphery relation but also because of the push originating in Hungary and 
exercising a similar intensity. This latter was, of course, mostly of a political 
character: it was in connection with World War I, the disintegration of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the leftist revolution erupting after the war 
and the then following reprisals and antisemitism which strongly affected 
those that fled at that time. But, of course, Hungary promised no great 
perspectives for scientists of such a quality in general. Neither actual nor 
potential research conditions could be but compared to those in Germany and 
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still, surveying the individual cases we find that the push emanating from their 
country played a dominant role with most of them. Two types of pushes have 
to be differentiated: the direct one that touched upon the person of the 
scientist itself (e.g. George von Hevesy and Theodore von Karman were 
hounded out because of their activity to during the 1919 Bolshevik revolution) 
and the second type of push when the scientist was harassed because of his 
family (e.g. the families Teller and von Neumann during the Bolshevik revolu-
tion). Though never denying the effect from the pull from Germany a high 
importance is attributed to the push exercised by Hungary. 
Whether tIllS way or the other, the important Hungarian scientist-talents 
got to Germany, where, as formulated by Ch. Weiner, they became members 
of the international "seminary", that founded modern theoretical physics and 
later migrated to the other side of the Ocean [3]. They got to know each other 
and became a loose group esteeming each other in this seminary and as a 
result their fate, their activity is spoken of as a specific "Hungarian 
phenomenon". [4] 
Just as they were "different" in the first step because they arrived in 
Germany as an effect of push, they were also "different" when making their 
second step. They differed from the general cases, (which never existed of 
course) because they hardly can be included in the wide category of "deutsch-
sprachig" scientists as they were Hungarians and for them leaving Germany 
did not mean the agonizing effect of leaving their native country. But they 
were also "different" because even in the second step they did not follow the 
plausible pattern. 
The pattern to be concluded from Szilard's story is that after April 7, 
1933 viz. after the infamous "Law for Restoration of the Career Civil Service" 
was born, which made it practically impossible for Jewish scientists to con-
tinue working in Germany, a kind of "scientist-exodus" began as a result of 
which the centre of science shifted to the United States. It is a matter of 
debate, naturally, whether Nazism in itself caused the process or together with 
other facts, or perhaps only accelerated a process that had already begun. [5] 
What is important is that Nazism expelled a number of excellent scientists 
who tried to settle down in other countries, mainly in the United States and 
to continue their career there. According to the formerly used terminology the 
substance of the pattern is that the old centre exercised a strong push and as 
an effect the scientists moved to the new centre. 
To be able to describe their route it is expedient to differentiate the types 
of emigration. We are speaking about enforced emigration when the prevail-
ing conditions do not enable normal life and work anymore; spontaneous 
emigration follows if the scientist changes countries without immediate com-
pulsion, seeking better possibilities. It is obvious that the migration of Jewish 
scientists from Germany was an enforced emigration as not only their work 
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but also their life was in danger. Spontaneous emigration however was when 
a person found unanimously better research or living conditions outside his 
native country as was the case e.g. for a number of East-European scientists 
in the seventies and eighties, in the United States. One can thus say that prior 
to World War Il, an enforced emigration was observed after the war, dis-
regarding the consequences of some political upheavals, we saw a spon-
taneous emigration. But, as already mentioned, a number of things happened 
"differently" with the Hungarians. 
True, there were those who followed the basic pattern: they became 
victims of Nazism as Leo Szilard or Edward Teller. Neither of them went 
directly to America from Germany, they made a stop over. His old friend, 
professor Eucken told Teller that though he would like him to remain at his 
side, he cannot see any future for him in Germany. This was the situation 
when he ought to look for an American opening. But this was not the natural 
place for Teller, it was Hungary. He returned and his mother tried to persuade 
him to remain. Teller's answer however was: "in the long run, I will be in much 
greater danger if I stay at home." Thus, at the invitation of G. F. Donnan he 
first went to London, and then spent a year in Copenhague, with a scholarship 
in 1934. In the meantime Donnan secured him a lectureship but also the 
invitation of a friend, G. Gamow arrived to George Washington University 
with a position as full professor. He was then 26, and on the one hand good 
pay, a prestigious position awaited him while on the other, the threat of a 
world-wide catastrophe, dark tyranny, persecution. The decision was not 
difficult to make. [6] 
Denis Gabor is the inventor of holography, a Nobel prize winner who 
also followed Teller's solution but stayed in England. The only non-negligible 
difference between the two is that Gabor returned to Hungary and accepted 
a position in the research laboratory of the factory Tungsram which at that 
time could boast with up to date products and the best experimental research 
institute of the country. However. it was in no position to compete with a job 
offer from England that enticed Denis Gabor from the country in 1934 and 
it was to his great advantage. As already mentioned, he stayed there and did 
not follow Teller's example, din not move to the United States [7]. 
Szilard's case strongly resembles to that of Teller. He, too, arrived in the 
States via England, but with a more restricted outlook, he had a scholarship 
but for six months. He sent a letter to his friend, Michael Polanyi, saying that 
he intended to travel to America but a year before the outbreak of the war, 
a statement that sounded laughable at best as who could have known when 
the war would start; but Szilard held himself to his statement with acceptable 
accuracy. [8] 
Polanyi, on the other hand, belonged to those who in the beginning 
contemplated the possibility to protest against political conditions, and that 
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together with Planck and Schrodinger. In a short time, though they found that 
there was no hope of any result [9]. Szilard who for some mysterious reasons 
tried to organize everybody for everything wrote: "M. Pohinyi like many 
others took a very optimistic view of the situation. They all thought that 
civilized Germans would not stand for anything really rough happening." 
Though he had an offer to the chair of physical chemistry in Manchester, he 
did not want to make use of it, because he believed to loose his productivity 
because of the change for at least a year. Szilard however persuaded him not 
to give a definite answer but to refer to something that would enable him to 
play for time. After the Reichstag was set on fire, Polanyi took leave from his 
institute with an aching heart. It was luck that, at Szilard's advice he did not 
burn his boats to Manchester. According to a colleague: "he said previously 
he had refused the offer extended to him on the grounds that he was suffering 
from rheumatism, but it appears that Hitler cured his rheumatism" [10]. 
George von Hevesy the Nobel prize winner inventor of the radioactive 
tracer method was also a professor in Freiburg, Germany and similarly to 
Polanyi, he also renounced his job voluntarily but did not leave the continent. 
In 1934 he returned to Copenhagen from where the University of Freiburg 
enticed him in 1926. From Copenhague he left for Sweden in 1943, his last 
living place, as a result of immediate persecution. [11] 
The intensive push emanating from the Nazi Germany thus sent some 
people to America and some to more secure European countries. Mathemati-
cian George P6lya, author of the book: "How to solve it" was taken by the 
storm from another country, Switzerland, across the Ocean. In vain was P6lya 
professor of mathematics in secure Switzerland, as he put it he did not wish 
to live on the same continent with Mr. Hitler and so rather chose the opposite 
bank, where together with his friend and co-author for life. Gabor Szego, he 
landed within a short time in Stanford, where he dropped anchor. [12] 
The really "different" ones did not get this way to America, through 
more or less enforced emigration. The "taking leave" of Polanyi, Hevesy, 
Gabor, even Teller and Szilard can be listed with the type of enforced emigra-
tion. The great renouncers. it is true. stayed in Europe: neither Hevesy, nor 
Polanyi or Gabor left the old continent. And from among those who did leave 
it, several were not forced to do so not even, as say George P6lya. 
An example for spontaneous emigration is, e.g. E. P. Wigner and John 
von Neumann. The circumstances were told by Wigner in detail to Th. Kuhn 
in an oral history interview gathering together the historical sources of quan-
tum mechanics. "1 received a telegram one morning said Wigner: Princeton 
University offers you a lectureship of ... $4000. Please cable reply" .... 
"Johnny by that time had a telegram somew'hat earlier offering him a similar 
thing (about $5000). But $4000 was an inconceivable sum for me, I never 
thought it existed." \Vigner related the offer to t\\"o \\"ell-kno\\"J1 professors, 
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Becker and Haber, with whom he was in direct connection in Germany. Both 
advised him to accept, and Haber immediately called the minister on the 
phone and told him indignantly: "Well, it is too bad that the Americans have 
to tell us whom we should promote." [13] 
From Ch. Weiner's and Mehra's oral history interview we also learn that 
it was P. Ehrenfest who stood behind the offers. It was he who said that if the 
scientific spirit was to be modernized in Princeton, not one but two foreigners 
should be invited. It is characteristic for Wigner's legendary modesty to say 
that a claim was put in for von Neumann in any case and thus they looked 
around for somebody who published jointly with von Neumann and he was 
found. The fact that he was somebody in his own right, never entered his 
mind. [14] 
All this happened in 1930 when Nazism was but a distant threat. The six 
month stay was extended with a visiting professorship, which, very wisely, 
meant six months in Princeton and another six months in a town they were 
to choose themselves. After a certain time this solution lost its beauty. It was 
perfectly obvious to Wigner that: "the days of foreigners in Germany, par-
ticularly with Jewish ancestry were numbered." He was farsighted enough to 
know that: ·'the regime would precipitate a blood bath in Europe or would 
subjugate nations without war." When Weiner asked him if he did not judge 
the situation on the basis of Szihird's prophecy, Wigner meant that was as 
obvious as the fact that it was colder in December than in summer. [14] This 
shows that there were also others, who "arrived one day earlier." 
Theodore von Karman's case is very similar to that of von Neumann and 
Wigner but at the time he emigrated he \vas no more a promising young man 
but a professor in Aachen who had already made his name. one of the most 
important scientists in aeronautics. He made up his mind to move to America 
after a long courting process that had begun in 1926. An institute of aeronaut-
ics was supposed to be established at Caltech. from a Guggenheim founda-
tion. it was also planned to start training specialists and Kanmin was invited 
to a lecture tour serving to get known mutually. Then, seeing the success of 
this lecture tour. he was bombarded with ever better offers. In 1929, a letter 
written by R. A. Millikan promised that he could return to his chair in Aachen 
regularly and also that in Akron, Ohio a branch of the Pasadena laboratory 
would be established and Karman would be head of both. He finally made up 
his mind and moved to The United States in 1929 but up till 1934 spent part 
of the year in Aachen. At that time he received a letter from Germany asking 
him to decide where he wanted to live, there or in America. The letter made 
him renounce his post in Germany without second thought and he took up his 
abode in America, to live a life stimulating from every respect. [16] 
The mentioned cases obviously belong to the sphere of spontaneous 
emigration. The pull starting from America had a stronger effect than the 
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push from the side of Germany though no one is denying the role of the latter. 
Wigner and von Neumann could probably thank the highly advantageous 
offers to the one-sidedness of contemporary American physics. The field of 
physics was rich in excellent experimenters but very poor in theoreticians and 
recognition of this made the physicists achieve to try to wind up this one-
sidedness by importing excellent experts. It was tried to get near to Einstein, 
Born, Heisenberg, but it was obviously easier to get Neumann and Wigner [17] 
as for them this was also a second step, their roots in Germany were not too 
deep. To be sure, this pull made itself also in Teller's case with the difference 
that Teller could be considered a refugee already when the invitation was 
extended, while Neumann and Wigner were not yet. Karman also had to 
thank the American development intentions for his invitation, and also to his 
specific ability that he was able to handle mathematical theory with a unique 
assurance in a highly practical field. After all, the cause behind the pull may 
be found most probably in the requirement for theory in American science. 
Let us say that the "differentness" of Hungarians, or at least some of 
them was that in a period when Germany's push was highly dominant in the 
dynamics of scientific migration, they much rather felt the pull of the new 
centre which then took them away from Europe. 
What then followed was the war when not much migration was possible 
if only not as in the case of Laszl6 Zechmeister, an excellent organic chemist 
who received an invitation as a lecturer in chromatography in 1940 when 
Hungary had not yet entered the war. Zechmeister arrived in the States but 
could not return because of the war and he too found a position in Pasadena, 
at the Caltech. [18] 
Spontaneity is unequivocal in the case of emigration following the war 
and one would believe that the pull to manifest itself, as by that time America 
grew to be a leading scientific power and the ravages of war also brought her 
further comparative advantages. Once again all this is not quite the case for 
Hungarians. And the latter statement contains, implicitly, that Hungarian 
scientists, and not unimportant ones did remain in Hungary. 
George von Bekesy for instance had a chair at the Budapest university 
and in his laboratory he undertook very important work first of all concerning 
the mechanics of hearing for which, though a physicist, he was awarded the 
medical Nobel prize. In one of his recollections he states that it was quite 
obvious to him that Hungary would be occupied by the Russians. As he wrote, 
his mechanic was deported to Russia, his equipment and writings were de-
stroyed [19]. "The whole section under attack was destroyed" he wrote 
"including the section where I lived, near the Danube. The highest wall left 
was about one meter high. I had many friends living in that section so I visited 
them before I decided to leave. I shouted their names under the blue sky but 
nobody came out so I went from one opening to another as I knew they had 
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to come out for water." He concluded: "Since it was obvious that I would not 
be able to continue my scientific work, I decided to leave Hungary." [20] 
This highly dramatic description suggests that the cause for emigration 
was the ravage caused by war. However. his correspondence indicates that the 
term "leave" was then considered but a "temporary leave." He wanted to 
return after his scholarship to Stokholm terminated and he went to Stockholm 
only to be able to work till work conditions in his own institute would be 
restored. In the meantime, in 1947, J. S. Stevens invited him to Harvard, an 
invitation he could not resist and also the situation in Budapest had not 
cleared up in a year. He asked for further leave from the university to be able 
to accept the invitation to Boston in one of the six months of the following 
year. He had to fight for the year prolongation and from the intensity of this 
fight and from a number of private letters one may draw the conclusion that 
he really wanted to return. But, in the meantime, the political situation had 
changed. The situation described by one of his colleagues in a letter must have 
been unequivocal and clear enough to make him decide for Harvard, for good. 
But it was described by Beh:sy himself that in his case, however strange 
it may seem, the push was stronger than pull emanating from the heights of 
Harvard because. as he puts it. the style of research in Hungary was more 
advantageous for him than the one in America. But it seems sure that the 
drastic transformation of his chair must have put an end to these happy 
conditions. 
The soil seemed to have slipped similarly from beneath Zoltan Bay when. 
in 1948, after an invitation to Vienna he no more returned to Hungary. Bay 
was famous mainly for his experiments concerning radar echoes from the 
moon and later for his coincidence experiments undertaken already at the 
George Washington University. The micro-waves reflected from the moon he 
measured as head of the laboratory of the already mentioned Tungsram 
factory [22]. During the \var he put up a fight to save the factory known for 
its very high level. but following the war even he could not do anything. the 
Russians dismantled and transported away the most important machines. 
Obviously. he believed to have no future here anymore. and so he made use 
of his American connections. [18] 
The push effects brought about by the post-war situation are rather 
similar, as for instance the case of the Nobel prize \vinner Albert Szent-
GyorgyL who discovered Vitamin C. Though it should be mentioned that 
these effects were less direct in his case. Szent-Gyorgyi did not believe his 
research possibilities were gloomy but the political situation, a fact that was 
more important in his case than in that of other scientists. He belonged to 
those who - similarly to Bekt~sy - returned to Hungary after a time spent 
abroad (that was back in 1930) to continue their career here. He was in no 
imminel1l danger because of ancestry during the Nazi occupation of the 
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country, but very much so because of being an active resistant who, tried to 
establish mainly English connections and prepare Hungary's jumping out 
from the war. He hoped to become prime minister after the war and thus have 
a decisive influence in a democratic rebuilding of the country. Instead he could 
achieve but a scientific-political role, though a very important one. 
Szent-Gyorgyi paid a visit to the Soviet Union as early as 1946 and spoke 
about it with enthusiasm in newspaper interviews. Together with his friend the 
author Lajos Zilahi he became co-presidents in the Hungarian-Soviet Cul-
tural Society and as vice-president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences he 
played a decisive role in modernizing science, fought a great fight to reform 
the scientific community which was backward in many respects. [24] 
In 1947 Szent-Gyorgyi, whose voice could be with great strength in 
public life, in politics and in the newspapers left for Switzerland. His close 
friend ZoItan Bay put the question: "Albert, are you leaving now not to 
return?" "Upon my word I will return" was the answer. We do not know for 
sure why he did not. According to Bay, his decision was made because he got 
news that one of his acquaintances, Istvan Rath was arrested and beaten up. 
Szent-Gyorgyi lodged a threatening protest with the Soviet foreign minister, 
Molotov. Rath, who was his partner in a smaller pharmaceuticals factory to 
be founded jointly was set free and left for America within short where he 
continued to support Szent-Gyorgyi's research work. [25] The substance of 
the matter is that he probably understood-according to some opinions he 
was warned-that his personal freedom is endangered, not in the least because 
of his wartime connections with Western powers and that, at that time, was 
a threat to life. I did not succeed to find any documents proving the mentioned 
danger but fright itself was more than enough to such a decision. 
Szent-Gyorgyi thus did not emigrate because of an American pull-effect, 
he did not even believe much in research possibilities. This is indicated by the 
fact that he requested a prolongation of his stay abroad several times and felt 
the situation sufficiently sure for the final breach only after having obtained 
a suitable position in Woods Hole. 
He and his colleagues realized a certain mixture of spontaneous and 
enforced migration. They left on their own decision towards centres offering 
better research and living conditions but in this decision the fact that they did 
not see any guarantee for their further work and even were afraid for their 
personal safety, played a major role. Their final decision was made only after 
this standpoint had crystallized and this indicates that pressure may have been 
more important than the spontaneous element. 
To sum up it can thus be said that the most important Hungarian 
scientists arrived to America from their countries situated along the periphery 
in two ways. On the one hand they arrived from Germany, viz. through a 
t\vo-step emigration and on the other they went directly from their mother 
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country. Those of the first group emigrated before the war, while the latter 
arrived after the war. It is curious to note that in the case of the first group 
scientists the scientific possibilities of the new centre seem to have made a 
major impact than the pull-effect emanating from Germany. This of course 
may be not because the Nazis gave them a favourable treatment but because 
they left earlier for the United States before being persecuted. The other 
group, where Nazism-at least directly--could not have played a role, decid-
ed to emigrate not so much because of the attraction of the American centre 
but because of the push making itself felt due to the gradually more threaten-
ing Stalinism. In both groups enforced and spontaneous elements can be 
observed but quite unexpectedly we find that among those who left for 
America during Nazi times spontaneity had a relatively high effect while 
among the post-war ones enforced emigration played a high role. A sort of 
discrepancy can be seen among the motives, however: the push-effect started 
in each case from outside science, from politics, from some kind of totalitarian 
system. The pull effect on the other hand manifested itself in most cases from 
within science, from the new research possibilities opened up, and sometimes 
financial causes played a role as well. 
If we now compare the two steps of the emigration of Hungarians, the 
hitherto investigations indicate that in both of them the push effect coming 
from the peripheries was as significant as the pull-effect coming from the 
centre. But, while the push-effect had a political character in both steps, the 
pull-effect seems to be more of an intellectual nature in the first step than in 
the second. While in Germany the highly stimulating atmosphere was the 
main attraction, this cannot be proved in connection with America for the 
scientists belonging to the "Hungarian phenomenon". It seems rather prob-
able that the main attraction here was the possibility of research work and a 
life free from danger, but of course also a scientific structure was needed that 
was able to absorb them. The intellectual value produced by their work was 
the means with which they paid generously for their reception. 
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